“Police Are An Easy Target”: John Robertson

In April 2007, a report on the Maldives Police Service (MPS) by Scottish consultant John Robertson caused a storm when it was leaked to Minivan News, who published it in full – including its portrait of the service as overstaffed, undertrained, and on occasions brutal.

Robertson described the MPS Special Operations Command as an “openly paramilitary organisation” and a “macho elite…most of whom lack basic police training.”

But in the ensuing correspondence with readers, Robertson himself leapt to the defence of the force, highlighting what he said was a “willing[ness] to…develop into a thoroughly modern and professional organisation…[and] to implement 95 per cent of my recommendations”.

A year after the visit that prompted Robertson’s original report, Judith Evans caught up with the policeman of thirty years’ experience, to see what he now makes of Maldivian policing.

Success?

“I am very happy with the way that things are going,” says Robertson. “There have been some hiccups” in the reforms, “but I fully expected that – some were quite radical changes.”

Robertson was brought in as an expert in “front line, operational” police work – what he describes as “coal-face policing,” an apt phrase from a man who policed the UK miners’ strikes in the 1980s.

One achievement, he says, is the recruitment of women officers for front-line duty, a recommendation implemented “within days” of his suggesting it. Of the current crop of new recruits, he says, 15% are female.

Statistics recording has improved, he adds; police are on the path to “proactive policing” rather than just responding to events; and an internal complaints department is in place, though still in its infancy.

Robertson also claims improvements in the relationship between police and the public. A new Malé keyholders’ register kept by police has had the advantage of bringing police into contact with local businesses, he says.

Plus a scheme to send “school liaison officers” to meet with children should help young people to realise police are “people that they can turn to”.

Violence

But for many, such moves are merely public relations, with trust in the police limited by a belief the MPS is guilty of continuing brutality.

I put it to Robertson that cases such as the death of Hussein Solah – who was found dead six days after being taken into police custody, shortly after Robertson’s report was leaked last year – do far more damage than school liaison officers can repair.

The case also exposed huge gaps in police procedures, which were acknowledged even as police denied responsibility for Solah’s death.

“I’m not going to get into the mechanism of that particular case,” says Robertson. “I don’t know enough about it.” Robertson has not been involved with police detention centres, and highlights that neither is he “privy to all the intelligence” that police receive.

But he believes “police are always an easy target, in any form of society… Bad news is endemic in the police service, because we deal with bad things and bad people.”

And he highlights the difficulty of judging how to react to situations on the street, especially for young officers.

Yet allegations of violence have recently emerged not from the streets, but from custody – with ex-detainees from the Dhoonidhoo detention centre telling Minivan News that beatings are once more on the rise.

Robertson concedes that with a focus on front line policing, he may not have the full picture.

“I’ve got no doubt that there are still areas where things are probably not what they should be, but I can’t speak at first hand about that… I’m quite sure that…there is violence that goes on.”

In any case, he believes, the entire running of Dhoonidhoo should change. “There shouldn’t be police staffing [the detention centre] anyway. It’s not a police role, it’s a prison service role. I’m hoping that over time, that will change.”

Star Force

One of the most contentious areas of Robertson’s leaked report, completed in 2006, dealt with the Special Operations Command (SOC) of the police, which includes the notorious Star Force.

Robertson acknowledges: “I still don’t like the idea of a semi-paramilitary organisation being aligned with a civil police service.

“[The SOC] doesn’t really have an [equivalent] in the UK, but I think that’s by necessity of the situation here…the political situation is a bit more in turmoil. They see a need here for having that kind of backup.”

And the SOC may be called for in “situations, shall we say, on the street which are likely to…arise in the leadup to an election.”

Yet opposition figures, many of whom have been arrested for political activity, argue it is only political change that can temper the traditional violence of the Star Force, which has been censured by the Human Rights Commission.

Photographic evidence of Star Force officers surrounding and punching then Maldivian Democratic Party Chairperson Mohamed Nasheed (Anni) emerged as recently as April 2007 – after Robertson’s first visit – making it hard to stomach the argument that political change has necessitated the Star Force, and not the other way round.

Things are changing here too, says Robertson, with a new “take your time” approach in place for tense situations, and negotiation training planned.

“But don’t get the idea that I’m taking the view that what [the Star Force] were doing was totally wrong,” he is keen to emphasise – because “they saw it as a necessity.”

Soldiers To Victims

Robertson reminds me: “You’re only talking about three years ago that this was a military dominated country.

“The police force was [originally] about 400 officers detached from the MNDF [Maldives National Defence Force]. They’re now approaching 3,000. You can imagine the difficulties that’s causing, just with lack of experience apart from anything else.”

Police may also be victims, he argues. From what he has heard in the Maldives, Robertson believes “disturbances… in the street” can be “manipulated by others to get the police involved,” so that “that peaceful demonstrations had in their background an element who were there to cause trouble.”

And on recent gang violence, “my understanding is that some of the street disturbances were … set up to lure police officers into the area, so… officers could be attacked.”

Good Stories

As I prepare to leave, Robertson issues a plea which echoes his response to the original leak of his report. “You need to tell the good stories as well as the bad stories,” he urges.

I tell him some changes in the police have been evident on the ground, with police officers knocking on doors to introduce themselves as part of a new community policing initiative in recent weeks.

It seems John Robertson has had more opportunity to see this friendly side of Maldivian policing than the side which produces allegations of beatings, torture, and arbitrary arrest.

But with the Solah case still resonating in the public consciousness, it remains to be seen whether a balance of “good” or “bad” stories will emerge from his revamped Maldives Police Force.