Tag: Government Oversight Committee

JSC meetings with Fahmy in attendance “not valid,” concedes Attorney General

Attorney General Aishath Bisham told parliament’s Government Oversight Committee yesterday (June 4) that official meetings of a state institution would not be valid if a member with disputed legal status was in attendance.

In response to a question by MP Ali Waheed, the committee’s chair, Bisham insisted that Mohamed Fahmy Hassan would not have to be reinstated as chair of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) after the Supreme Court ruled that his removal by parliament was unconstitutional.

“My stand on this has not changed at all,” she said.

While Fahmy returned to work following the Supreme Court judgment, both Bisham and her predecessor Aishath Azima Shukoor had contended that he could not remain in the post.

Despite the previous Attorney General informing Fahmy of her legal opinion, the CSC later revealed that Fahmy resumed work after a letter from the President’s Office authorised him to do so.

Fahmy also began participating in meetings of the Judicial Service Commission (JSC) as an ex-officio member in his capacity as CSC chair.

Bisham told the oversight committee last night that she had shared her concerns with the JSC but refused to answer further questions on the issue.

Fahmy was in attendance at a JSC meeting on May 29 where a petition by Bisham to indefinitely suspend High Court Chief Judge Ahmed Shareef was voted through with three votes in favour and one against. Fahmy reportedly abstained in the vote.

Local media meanwhile reported yesterday that the JSC nominated Fahmy to represent the commission on the 13-member Zakat Committee, which was set up to oversee the Zakat trust fund.

At last night’s committee meeting, MP Ali Waheed asked Bisham whether a meeting of any state institution or independent commission with the participation of a member whose legal status was disputed could be valid.

“It would not [be valid],” she replied.

Following her concession, the Maldivian Democratic Party (MDP) MP for Thohdhoo in Alif Alif atoll thanked the Attorney General and immediately adjourned the committee meeting.

Supreme Court ruling

Fahmy was dismissed from his CSC post in November 2012 in a no-confidence vote in parliament following an inquiry by the Independent Institutions Committee into allegations of sexual harassment against a CSC employee.

Both Fahmy and the victim were summoned to committee after the complaint was lodged in the first week of June.

Fahmy was alleged to have called the female staff member over to him, taken her hand and asked her to stand in front of him so that others in the office could not see, and caressed her stomach saying ”it won’t do for a beautiful single woman like you to get fat.”

MPs voted 38-32 to approve the committee’s recommendation to remove Fahmy from the post.

The Supreme Court however ruled 6-1 in March 2013 that Fahmy would receive two punishments for the same crime if he was convicted at court following his dismissal by parliament (double jeopardy).

The apex court contended that the Independent Institutions Committee violated due process and principles of criminal justice procedure in dealing with the accused.

Delivering the judgment, Supreme Court Justice Abdulla Saeed reportedly said that a person should be considered innocent unless proven guilty in a court of law and was entitled to protect his reputation and dignity.

In his dissenting opinion, Justice Muthasim Adnan – the only Supreme Court justice with a background in common law – however noted that article 187(a) of the constitution authorised parliament to remove members of the CSC “on the ground of misconduct, incapacity or incompetence.”

Article 187(b) meanwhile states, “a finding to that effect by a committee of the People’s Majlis pursuant to article (a), and upon the approval of such finding by the People’s Majlis by a majority of those present and voting, calling for the member’s removal from office, such member shall be deemed removed from office.”

Justice Adnan argued that an inquiry by a parliamentary committee into alleged misconduct would not be a criminal investigation. Therefore, he added, the oversight committee would not be required to prove guilt to the extent required at trial before making a decision.

He further noted that parliament’s dismissal under the authority of article 187 and a possible conviction at a late date could not be considered meting out two punishments for the same offence.

Likes(0)Dislikes(0)

Summary: Testimony of former police chief superintendent to Government Oversight Committee

In January 2013, parliament’s Government Oversight Committee heard testimony from six of the highest-ranking officers of the police and military for its review of the Commission of National Inquiry’s (CoNI’s) report into the transfer of presidential power on February 7, 2012. Minutes of the closed-door sessions (Dhivehi) along with audio recordings were made public on January 16, 2013.

Following is a translated summary of the testimony from former Chief Superintendent of Police Mohamed Jinah to the oversight committee on January 11, 2013. Jinah, then head of the Drug Enforcement Department (DED), was sacked from the police service two days later.

On the night of February 6, 2012, Jinah arrived at the police headquarters around 10:30pm. As he was due to leave the country for medical purposes the following night, Jinah went to finalise administrative matters concerning his leave of absence.

Jinah went up to the executive room on the fifth floor to find Chief Superintendent Mohamed ‘MC’ Hameed, who was then head of police intelligence. Hameed was there with other intelligence officers monitoring live CCTV footage from the artificial beach.

Jinah saw opposition protesters and ruling party supporters facing off and throwing rocks at each other. Hameed was upset with the withdrawal of riot police.

Jinah stepped out to the foyer and met Commissioner of Police Ahmed Faseeh. The commissioner informed him that President Mohamed Nasheed had ordered the Specialist Operations (SO) officers to be withdrawn. Jinah told the commissioner that “something big” must have happened for the president to issue such a command.

Hearing a loud commotion, Jinah went downstairs and saw SO officers filing into Republic Square. They were shouting and gathering at the helipad area.

Jinah began working with intelligence chief Hameed to find out what was happening. They soon learned that rogue SO officers had assaulted government supporters at the artificial beach and ransacked the ruling Maldivian Democratic Party’s (MDP’s) Haruge (meeting hall).

Upon learning that the military was preparing to arrest the rogue police officers, Jinah warned the police deputy commissioners of dire consequences should a violent confrontation occur between the security services. Jinah advised approaching the protesting police “professionally and wisely” to negotiate. However, none of the senior officers had command and control at the time and Commissioner Faseeh was inside military headquarters.

Jinah saw soldiers form ranks and prepare to charge only to withdraw every time, appearing reluctant to confront the mutinying police. “I did not fully believe even then that the soldiers didn’t know how or were unable to do it.”

At 7:30am, Jinah and Hameed called Faseeh and attempted to arrange a meeting with the SO commanders at the commissioner’s office. A senior SO officer named Ahmed Abdul Rahman was to be present as a witness.

While the communications were ongoing, Jinah heard clashes erupt at the Republic Square and saw from the foyer window tear gas canisters being thrown. The mutinying police clashed with soldiers. During the confrontation, some soldiers joined the mutiny.

Jinah and Hameed were at the conference room when they heard loud clamouring from inside the headquarters. When they stepped outside, Jinah saw a group of officers holding back the door to the (executive) officer’s block.

“They were blocking the door and said [the mutinying officers] were coming threatening to kill.” The junior officers vowed that the mutinying police would have to kill them to enter the conference room.

“I said, ‘you don’t have to die. They don’t have to die either. What is this talk of dying? Open the door.’ Then when I asked a bit angrily they opened the door.”

Mutinying officers outside were claiming that MDP activists had killed a police officer and set fire to several buildings. Jinah learned later that none of the claims were true. But at the time an officer was crying and claiming that an iron rod was shoved into the victim’s neck.

“The way he said it a police officer was speared like a fish. So the boys gathered there were enraged.”

A group of SO officers then forcibly dragged Jinah and Hameed away, shoving and beating the senior officers. Jinah noticed that a junior officer named Shifau appeared to be in charge. Shifau had “a closet full of disciplinary records.”

Shifau grabbed him by the cuff and complained about a disciplinary committee hearing where he was questioned by Jinah. Another group of police arrived and drew the pair apart. Jinah and Hameed were kept aside for about 45 minutes.

They heard groups of mutinying officers armed with iron rods calling for Faseeh and other senior officers, threatening to kill. One group found Jinah and Hameed and dragged them away, pushing and shoving. Hameed however managed to escape and ran to the fourth floor.

Jinah also wriggled free and hurried to his office on the third floor. Jinah saw that the drug storage “strong room” next to his office was open and its lock destroyed. All the illegal narcotics seized by police were stored there.

“The door was smashed. So in truth the place where the drugs were stored was on sale that day. The place was open for anyone to enter and take anything they want.”

“Then I ran inside my office and was locking some documents and personal belongings inside a drawer when they came and broke down the door.”

The harddisk on Jinah’s computer along with some confidential case files have since not been recovered.

The mutinying officers shoved and pushed Jinah down the stairs. He was taken inside the Gaazee building and kept there for about an hour, after which Shifau and two other officers came with handcuffs.

“They said my hands will be cuffed behind the back. I said you can’t do it behind. You should kill me if you want cuff my hands behind my back.”

The mutinying officers discussed amongst themselves and said OK. They cuffed Jinah’s hands in front and led him outside, all the while shoving and beating him with their boots.

A group of Progressive Party of Maldives (PPM) activists joined the mutinying officers escorting Jinah. Both the civilian group and mutinying officers called for Jinah to be mobbed and lynched.

However, another group of civilians and police officers, which included Jinah’s friends and relatives, ran over and surrounded him. They protected Jinah and put him on a speedboat to the police detention island of Dhoonidhoo.

At Dhoonidhoo, Jinah noted that the officers on duty there were not involved in the mutiny. They took off his handcuffs. The officer-in-charge, Staff Sergeant Mujthaba Zahir, informed Jinah that a junior officer named Azeem Waheed called and said Jinah was on the way.

Shortly thereafter, inmates at the detention center broke out of their cells. They included dangerous criminals arrested by Jinah.

Jinah was protected by officers on duty. A group of SO officers soon arrived to quell the inmate uprising. Jinah found out that SO officers had come to Dhoonidhoo after midnight, broken into the armoury and taken away all the weapons.

Jinah called then-Vice President Dr Mohamed Waheed. Jinah had worked closely with Waheed as the vice-president was in charge of the previous administration’s pledge to combat drug trafficking and abuse. But Waheed did not answer. He sent a text message to Waheed’s secretary and was told that the president-in-waiting would attend to Jinah’s predicament.

“He hasn’t attended to it yet. Next February it will be one year to February 7.”

Jinah learned from the Dhoonidhoo staff that current Commissioner Abdulla Riyaz and State Minister for Home Affairs Mohamed Fayaz ‘FA’ were in charge of police. He called the pair. Riyaz claimed he did not know anything about Jinah’s arrest and hung up the phone. Fayaz said the same and asked Jinah what he was doing in Dhoonidhoo.

Jinah then called Faseeh and asked him to get Superintendent Abdulla Fairoosh, who had taken over as acting commissioner, to send a speedboat to Dhoonidhoo. But Faseeh said he was in the process of resigning.

“In any case, I managed to get a launch after a lot of work. I got the launch and left on it. I went and stayed at HIH [Hulhule’ Island Hotel]. From there I flew overseas that night.”

Jinah learned later that President Nasheed knew of his arrest before his resignation.

“Arresting officers of the security forces is one element of a coup d’etat. We were the responsible officers of the [security] service at the time. I believe taking away our powers and arresting us was one of the first acts of the mutiny. So they did that.

“I believe that I definitely would not have been able to return alive and safely to my family if President Nasheed did not resign. I was under arrest and in their custody at the time. Therefore, I believe that President Nasheed resigned under duress to save me and others in my situation as well as to save the lives of everyone else who could have been harmed.”

Jinah observed that mutiny or rebellion against the government by the security forces was “an element of Third World countries.”

The mutinying police and army officers on February 7 “took upon themselves the label of a Third World country on their own.”

At CoNI, Jinah was asked mostly about the arrest of Dr Mohamed Jameel Ahmed in January 2012. Apart from asking Jinah to recount his experience of February 7, the commission members did not ask questions regarding the events that immediately preceded the transfer of power.

“I basically do not accept the [CoNI] report at all. The reason is because I recounted what happened to me. There are photos and videos of me in handcuffs being beaten and dragged. However, the [CoNI] timeline stated that I was arrested for my own security and protection. So how can I accept the CoNI report? I can never accept that report.”

(Read summaries of the testimony from former police intelligence chief Mohamed ‘MC’ Hameed, Brigadier General Ahmed Nilam and Commissioner of Police Ahmed Faseeh).

Likes(0)Dislikes(0)

Summary: Testimony of former police commissioner to Government Oversight Committee

In January 2013, parliament’s Government Oversight Committee heard testimony from six of the highest-ranking officers of the police and military for its review of the Commission of National Inquiry’s (CoNI’s) report into the transfer of presidential power on February 7, 2012. Minutes of the closed-door sessions (Dhivehi) along with audio recordings were made public on January 16, 2013.

Following is a translated summary of the testimony from former Commissioner of Police Ahmed Faseeh to the oversight committee on January 11, 2013. Faseeh retired from the police service shortly after President Mohamed Nasheed’s resignation.

Three or four nights before February 6, 2012, opposition coalition protesters at the Maldives Monetary Authority (MMA) building area took to the streets and began marching through the narrow roads of the capital. At the time, the demonstrations were taking place every night in front of the MMA building, after which the protesters would march across Male’ until the early hours of morning.

On the night in question, about 800 people were gathered at the Maldivian Democratic Party (MDP) Haruge (meeting hall) on Ameenee Magu. Fearing a possible confrontation, Faseeh asked his commanders to make sure that the opposition protesters do not reach Haruge.

While he was inside the police headquarters, Faseeh suddenly heard a platoon of Specialist Operations (SO) riot police take off on a police vehicle.

Acting without orders, the SO platoon stormed Haruge and pepper-sprayed ruling party supporters.

Faseeh called Defence Minister Tholhath Ibrahim and asked for a platoon of soldiers to be sent to the area to control the situation. The SO officers left Haruge when the military platoon arrived.

Following the SO attack on Haruge, two groups of MDP activists led by MPs Alhan Fahmy and ‘Reeko’ Moosa Manik made their way to the Supreme Court building and MMA area. With no command from senior officers, SO officers forcibly broke up the group led by Reeko Moosa as soon as they reached the MMA building.

The next morning, then-head of police intelligence, Chief Superintendent Mohamed ‘MC’ Hameed, informed Faseeh of an intercepted phone call between a SO lance corporal and Progressive Party of Maldives (PPM) MP Ahmed Mahloof. The call was intercepted and shared by military intelligence.

In the recorded phone call, the SO officer boasts of pepper spraying people at Haruge and beating up MDP activists when they came to the MMA area. MP Mahloof asks the lance corporal why they did not break MP Moosa Manik’s leg.

“And [the SO officer] replies, ‘we can’t just break [his leg] like that. That’s not how this is going on.’ In any case, they talked like they were the closest buddies.”

The officer was immediately transferred out of the SO unit to Feydhoo Finolhu pending disciplinary proceedings.

On the night of February 6, President Nasheed called Faseeh and asked for the SO to be withdrawn. Opposition coalition protesters and ruling party supporters were facing off at the artificial beach with riot police separating the rival demonstrators.

Nasheed told the commissioner that he did not have confidence in police based on reliable intelligence information, which suggested that riot police were working with the opposition. Faseeh recalled the intercepted phone call and wondered if the President’s order was prompted by similar intelligence information.

Faseeh then asked Defence Minister Tholhath Ibrahim to dispatch a platoon of soldiers from the Maldives National Defence Force (MNDF) to take over from riot police. The soldiers were sent to artificial beach an hour later and the SO officers reluctantly withdrew to Republic Square. Riot police troops were staged at the helipad in the middle of the square.

Faseeh was in his office with Assistant Commissioner Sodiq when he heard a loud commotion coming from Republic Square. From his balcony, Faseeh saw police vehicles taking off and SO officers screaming, “let’s go beat them up.”

Faseeh ran downstairs and saw SO officers running. Deputy Commissioner Ismail Atheef was there. Faseeh did not know what was going on.

He was later informed that Atheef snatched the keys from one of the police lorries. But the SO officers left on other vehicles while others ran to the artificial beach. The Republic Square was soon empty.

Shortly thereafter, a cousin called Faseeh and said a police lorry was going towards the MDP Haruge on Ameenee Magu. He said they were screaming obscenities very loudly.

MDP Haruge on February 7: Photo by Haveeru

“Then they went to MDP Haruge. They went inside MDP Haruge, beat up some people there and damaged things and even beat some people they met on the road.”

Faseeh also learned that they chased after and beat people at the artificial beach. After attacking Haruge the rogue SO officers returned to Republic Square. Faseeh was despairing “because my troops committed such lowly acts.”

“Even if they were given an order to do something illegal that does not mean they have to commit bigger crimes.”

Faseeh went out to Republic Square and asked Deputy Commissioners Atheef and Muneer to go talk with the SO officers. Faseeh waited near the flag post. Muneer returned and said they responded with filth and obscenities. Muneer advised Faseeh against meeting them.

Faseeh saw three or four officers carry Deputy Commissioner Atheef inside the headquarters after he fainted.

“What happened was Athee couldn’t believe these were actually police.”

Other officers, including “blues,” came out of the headquarters and started loitering around the square. The rogue SO officers at the helipad area occasionally called for the resignation of President Nasheed.

Around 11pm, Faseeh went to the military headquarters. President Nasheed called and asked what was going on.

“I said I don’t know what they’ve done. They are now in a mutiny.”

All the generals, the chief of defence forces and the defence minister were at the military headquarters. They were discussing how to get the police to withdraw.

Faseeh told the senior officers that the mutinying SO was his “elite force.”

“When the SO are insubordinate, there aren’t any others who could talk to them or control them.”

The officers then began preparing to control the situation. Faseeh stayed with Major General Moosa Ali Jaleel and Defence Minister Tholhath and saw that they started working on it.

“They started and gave different times. 12:30, 1:30, 2:30, 3:30. But by the time it turned 4 it still couldn’t be done. It kept dragging on.”

The soldiers would form ranks, get set and withdraw. “The soldiers were very cowardly.”

Around 4am, President Nasheed came to the military headquarters. He asked Major General Jaleel why the military were unable to push the SO back. Faseeh recalled that there were about 150 mutinying officers at the Republic Square at dawn.

The soldiers were sent out again but they did not confront the SO.

A frustrated President Nasheed suggested to Jaleel that he could accomplish the task with a water canon and 20 soldiers.

Shortly after the dawn prayer was called, President Nasheed asked Faseeh to meet the rogue police and attempt to advise them. After praying, Faseeh instructed his secretary to ask the SO commanders to come and meet the commissioner.

The commanders refused.

A few civilians were near the Republic Square at the time. Faseeh’s private secretary informed him that the SO officers were “worse than before and more aggressive.” Faseeh decided not to go out and meet them. He managed to pass on a message to the four SO squad commanders from President Nasheed assuring them that they would be treated fairly.

From inside the police headquarters, Faseeh heard MDP supporters heading into Republic Square from the Chandaneemagu-Orchidmagu junction.

The mutinying officers were chanting their core values, oath or mission statement with one arm on the chest. As soon as it was done, they turned and ran towards the MDP group.

Faseeh saw loud clashes and “a big fight.”

“That was when the flame was lit. And the boys who lost control there came and threw huge stones at the police office, threw things inside the police office, vandalised places, destroyed a lorry there, threw rocks at MNDF.”

Faseeh saw the police officers use their batons during the confrontation. After they vandalised the police office, Faseeh’s bodyguard wanted to take him to a secure location but he went to the administrative commissioner’s office.

The mutinying officers were running inside the police building making death threats. Chief Superintendents Hameed and Mohamed Jinah as well as Atheef were assaulted.

Two officers came looking for Faseeh but were thwarted by the commissioner’s secretary. They slammed into the door twice trying to break it down but soon left.

The violent officers “destroyed” the conference room and mess room and damaged electronic equipment and a television set.

Faseeh recalled forming the SO in 2004 by training and bodybuilding 35 recruits. They were used to control demonstrations staged by the MDP during the post-2003 pro-democracy movement.

“They are all really the same [riot police] sent out when the MDP people gathered back then to take away the rice pudding bowl, take down banners and do all that. So in truth there is going to be something of Maumoonism inside their heads.”

Faseeh decided to resign after hearing current Defence Minister Mohamed Nazim demand his resignation upon emerging from the military headquarters between 10:00am and 11:00am. Nazim said he had relayed a “non-negotiable” demand for President Nasheed to resign within the hour “without any conditions.”

Likes(0)Dislikes(0)

President’s Office media secretary defends barring Raajje TV from press events

President’s Office Media Secretary Masood Imad on Wednesday (April 10) defended the exclusion of private broadcaster Raajje TV from President Dr Mohamed Waheed Hassan Manik’s press conferences and events.

Masood was summoned to parliament’s Government Oversight Committee after Raajje TV filed a complaint alleging discriminatory treatment by the President’s Office.

Responding to questions from MPs, Masood said Raajje TV was not invited to press conferences and functions because the opposition Maldivian Democratic Party (MDP)-leaning TV station did not fit criteria or standards for reporting set by the President’s Office.

The policy of the President’s Office was to invite “responsible and experienced” media outlets, he said. Asked for a copy of the criteria by MDP MP Mohamed Shifaz, Masood offered to send it to the committee on Thursday (March 11).

According to Masood Imad, the news outlets that meets the President’s Office standards are newspapers Haveeru, Miadhu, Sun Online, state broadcaster TVM, private broadcasters DhiTV and VTV, and Minivan News.

“DhiTV is somewhat better than VTV,” he added.

Imad also said that private media were not invited on official trips by the President to minimise costs.

The Maldives Media Council (MMC) has meanwhile asked the Prosecutor General’s Office (PGO) to press charges against the President’s Office over the alleged discriminatory treatment of Raajje TV. In November 2012, the Maldives Broadcasting Commission (MBC) condemned the eviction of a Raajje TV crew from a press conference on orders from the President’s Office.

Likes(0)Dislikes(0)

Summary: Testimony of former police intelligence chief to Government Oversight Committee

In January 2013, parliament’s Government Oversight Committee heard testimony from six of the highest-ranking officers of the police and military for its review of the Commission of National Inquiry’s (CoNI’s) report into the transfer of presidential power on February 7, 2012. Minutes of the closed-door sessions (Dhivehi) along with audio recordings were made public on January 16, 2013.

Following is a translated summary of the testimony from former head of police intelligence Chief Superintendent Mohamed Hameed to the oversight committee on January 9, 2013. Hameed was fired in August 2012 by the police disciplinary board over allegations of leaking confidential information. He has since sued the police for unlawful termination.

Mohamed ‘MC’ Hameed joined the Maldives Police Service (MPS) on April 8, 1995. He was appointed head of the police intelligence department on January 17, 2010 following completion of a state-sponsored Masters degree in policing, intelligence and counterterrorism from the University of Sydney, Australia.

“I attended CoNI on April 15, 2012 and in addition I also attended the reconstituted CoNI. I believe it is because they did not consider what I said there to have much weight that important points from my two statements to CoNI were not highlighted in the report. The reason I am saying this is because what happened on February 6, 7 – I am not a legal expert but I have worked in the police profession for a very long time – I believe what happened with the police those two days should not have been seen from those belonging to a professional police service.”

Hameed believed that elements of the police mutinied on February 6 and 7. The CoNI report however did not highlight police misconduct, alleged brutality and disobedience that he “emphasised” at the commission.

When the new administration took office in November 2008, MPS did not have “a professional intelligence setup.” The previous intelligence department, known as Omega Sector, was referred among police as the “black room”. It was headed by current Commissioner of Police Abdulla Riyaz.

Police intelligence was focused on the political opposition to the then-government and did not provide much assistance or cooperation for routine policing. Hameed’s “main purpose” as the new head of police intelligence in 2010 was “setting up an intelligence mechanism needed for policing or law enforcement.”

At CoNI, Hameed was asked why police intelligence had not learned of a plot to overthrow the government if the events of February 6 and 7 were orchestrated and planned in advance.

“I said very clearly, if intelligence operated in the way it did in the police service before 2008, the incidents of February 6 and 7 would not have happened. It would not have been allowed [to happen].”

Gathering information from the political arena was “not a priority at all” for the department. However, the intelligence department did monitor political activities, especially protests or demonstrations that affect public peace.

“Considering the information I was receiving in my post, I do not believe what occurred on those two days happened spontaneously.”

Police received intelligence that plans were made to carry out anti-government activities with police involvement to disrupt a mass gathering planned by the formerly ruling Maldivian Democratic Party (MDP) for February 17, 2012 as part of its campaign for judicial reform.

“We had learned that discussions took place. This information would be recorded in the Maldives Police Service intelligence department intelligence reports and intelligence logs.”

On the night of February 6, when clashes erupted between opposition protesters and government supporters at the artificial beach, the intelligence department was monitoring the situation. Communications from the mutinying police from the Specialist Operations (SO) department at Republic Square were being intercepted.

An off-duty platoon from the SO was active at the artificial beach without orders.

Following the military’s detention of Chief Judge of the Criminal Court Abdulla Mohamed on January 16, 2012, anti-government graffiti was discovered in the toilets of the SO accommodation block at Iskandharu Koshi. The graffiti called for Police Commissioner Ahmed Faseeh, Deputy Commissioner Ismail Atheef and President Mohamed Nasheed to be killed.

“I believe that police as a whole was not ready for democratic governance. There were serious problems in the institution.”

The judge’s arrest sparked demonstrations by the opposition coalition for 22 consecutive nights. During that period, police would gather at the Republic Square at 7:00pm every night and follow the protests until 2:30am or 3am.

“The sole focus of police was on these demonstrations. During the whole day, the police service was almost asleep.”

On January 23, 2012, the intelligence department prepared an assessment report of the situation with a recommendation for the Commissioner of Police to seek the release of Judge Abdulla from military detention and find “another settlement” of the issue.

At the demonstrations outside the Maldives Monetary Authority (MMA) building, opposition leaders were publicly claiming that police and army officers would join their protest.

On January 17, 2012, ten senior police officers above the rank of chief inspector met with the Commissioner of Police and informed him that they “did not accept” having to control the protests against the judge’s arrest. The ten senior officers were in charge of police operations.

“One of them indirectly proposed that the commissioner resign that very day.”

In the coming days, police intelligence learned that some of the senior officers had separate meetings with the current Police Commissioner Abdulla Riyaz, State Minister for Home Affairs Mohamed Fayaz ‘FA’ and Defence Minister Colonel (Retired) Mohamed Nazim.

The ten senior officers were also noticeably absent from the police headquarters during the operations to control the opposition protests.

On January 18, 2012, President Mohamed Nasheed met with police officers of commissioned rank at the police headquarters theatre hall and attempted to explain the reasons for the judge’s arrest. A few days later, an audio clip of President Nasheed’s talk was leaked and broadcast on opposition-aligned DhiTV and Villa TV.

A police officer of a junior rank was meanwhile caught relaying information of the operation to opposition politicians leading the demonstrations. Riot police officers were also seen to be reluctant in taking action against unruly demonstrators.

A few nights before February 6, opposition protesters marched to the Maldives National Broadcasting Corporation (MNBC) building, located near the ruling party’s Haruge (meeting hall). In response, a group of MDP activists led by MDP MPs made their way to the Supreme Court building and MMA area.

In contrast to their attitude towards opposition demonstrators, SO officers deployed at the MMA area forcibly broke up the MDP protest as soon as it reached the police lines.

Police intelligence learned that a SO officer called Progressive Party of Maldives (PPM) MP Ahmed Mahloof later that night and bragged of having beaten up MDP supporters. In the intercepted call, MP Mahloof asked the officer why they did not break the leg of MDP MP ‘Reeko’ Moosa Manik at the protest.

Based on such intelligence information, the assessment report prepared on January 23 warned that the likelihood of “police and army officers coming out against the government” was high.

In the early hours of February 7, the special assessment unit of the Maldives National Defence Force (MNDF) responsible for intelligence regarding domestic security relayed information that PPM council member ‘Marz’ Ahmed Saleem was coordinating efforts to send speedboats to Dhoonidhoo and Feydhoo Finolhu to bring more police officers to join the mutinying police at the Republic Square.

Police intelligence also learned that some army officers inside military headquarters told the mutinying police around 4:00am that the soldiers would join the mutiny if they held on for four more hours. The intercepted calls between army and police officers were provided by MNDF intelligence.

At 10:30am on February 7, mutinying police assaulted Hameed and other senior officers inside the conference room on the 5th floor of the police headquarters and dragged them out “by the cuff”.

Hameed made his way to the office of the Police Commissioner on the 4th floor. At 11:00am, Chief Superintendent Abdulla Fairoosh came into the office, sat down and informed the commissioner that a team was going into the military headquarters to give President Nasheed an ultimatum. Fairoosh asked the commissioner what he intended to do.

“I took that indirectly [to mean] ‘I am taking over, so the commissioner of police should step aside or resign.’”

The commissioner then went to the conference room and made his parting remarks. All commissioned officers in Male’ were present, some in uniform and others in plainclothes. After the commissioner left, a vote was taken among the senior officers to appoint Fairoosh interim commissioner. Two assistant commissioners were present.

After Fairoosh took charge, Chief Superintendent Ahmed Saudhee then told Hameed that he was no longer head of the intelligence department. Hameed was to be replaced by Chief Inspector Abdul Mannan Yoosuf, who had been studying Business Administration in the UK and was in Male’ at the time on holiday.

Following the appointment of Abdulla Riyaz as commissioner on the night of February 8, 2012, Hameed was made a member of the executive team and appointed head of the service development directorate.

Earlier in the day, confronted by thousands of MDP supporters in a march across Male’, Hameed saw that the senior officers were “in shock” and appeared not to have command and control. Individual officers at the scene acted without orders.

As vice chair of the promotion board, Hameed also noted that 1,112 police officers were promoted on March 31, 2012 while only 600 forms were submitted under the normal promotion procedure. Commissioner of Police Riyaz had instructed heads of directorates to submit a list of officers in their departments for promotion.

Under promotion rules that were supposed to have been amended by then, the commissioner is authorised to “deviate from the normal promotion routine” and promote officers who have shown “special” qualities or exceptional performance.

The new lists were hastily approved during a promotion board meeting after midnight on March 31 while the promotion ceremony was scheduled for 10:00am the next morning. The board meeting was chaired first by Commissioner Riyaz and then Deputy Commissioner Hussain Waheed. The latter was receiving phone calls as late as 3:00am to add new names to the list of officers to be promoted.

Hameed’s objection to promoting officers suspected of brutality and breach of ethics on February 6, 7 and 8 was ignored. SO officers involved in the events were given single and double promotions.

“What we saw was that officers with a disciplinary record from the floor to the ceiling were given promotion by the executive board.”

Hameed further noted that failure to preserve CCTV footage from February 7 cast doubt on the “integrity of the current [police] leadership.” The footage was automatically wiped out on March 7, 2012.

Likes(0)Dislikes(0)

Summary: Testimony of Brigadier General Nilam to Government Oversight Committee

Following is a summary of the testimony (Dhivehi) of Brigadier General Ahmed Nilam of the Maldives National Defence Force (MNDF) to parliament’s Government Oversight Committee on January 9, 2013.

Brigadier General Ahmed Nilam was head of military intelligence until late 2011. At the time of the transfer of power, General Nilam was commander of the marine corp. In the wake of his testimony to the Government Oversight Committee, General Nilam was suspended and relieved of his duties by Defence Minister Colonel (Retired) Mohamed Nazim on January 18, 2013.

As his first intimation of a plot to overthrow the government through the security services, Nilam took note of an opposition demonstration on January 24, 2010, during which Umar Naseer led protesters to the MNDF headquarters and rattled the gates.

“My field officers [in the intelligence department] said they were seeing signs of something abnormal about to happen. But we could not know what it was, right?”

Nilam ordered the gates to be shut before the protesters made their way to the Republic Square or the “green zone” where gatherings are prohibited.

“I see now that there is a connection between the incidents that night and February 6. This is what I feel.”

In November 2010, a senior officer serving under the Vice Chief of Defence Forces Farhath Shaheer shared information of an alleged plot to assassinate President Mohamed Nasheed during a live-fire exercise on November 11, 2010. Based on the forewarning, President Nasheed did not attend the Republic Day function. The case was sent to police for further investigation.

In late 2011, then-Defence Minister Tholhath Ibrahim Kaleyfaan removed Nilam from his post as head of military intelligence. Within three months, he was appointed to two posts before being made commander of the marine corp.

Nilam learned that Tholhath made the decision on his own without consulting the commander-in-chief. Nilam saw that President Nasheed trusted the defence minister.

In November 2011, Nilam sent a six or seven page letter to President Nasheed expressing concern with Tholhath’s actions. The defence minister was interested in “very quickly purchasing expensive instruments.” Tholhath also made a number of changes to the military top brass, shuffling senior officers, including Commander of Special Forces Colonel Giyas.

A month after Nilam was removed as head of intelligence, his former deputy, Colonel Abdulla Zuhuree, was also transferred.

Prior to the arrest of Criminal Court Chief Judge Abdulla Mohamed, General Nilam participated in a meeting on January 15, 2012 with the Supreme Court bench, senior police officers and military officers to discuss national security threats posed by the judiciary.

In a meeting with senior military officers a day before, Tholhath spoke about taking the judge under military custody. Nilam opined that any person could be detained if he was a threat to national security. He however advised against moving too quickly and suggested planning and coordination with other institutions.

But the minister wanted it done immediately and asserted that he would take responsibility “even after 40 years.” Police had officially requested military assistance at the time in accordance with the law.

On the night of February 6, 2012, Nilam was unaware that the military was brought to red alert, the highest security status. He found out later from a timeline of events. Contrary to normal procedure, the duty head did not inform him nor was a message sent.

Nilam was having coffee with Chief of Defence Forces Major General Moosa Ali Jaleel when he saw Specialist Operations (SO) police on television running towards the artificial beach. The generals then made their way to the operation room. Both were in plainclothes. Nilam did not have any operational command at the time.

Shortly afterwards, SO officers returned to the Republic Square and began their protest or strike. Nilam decided against going to the barracks at Kalhuthukkala Koshi for his uniform.

“I felt staying inside would be better than going because it was unclear how this was unfolding. So I stayed as I was. It kept getting dragged on and on. And as I recall the then-President came [to the military headquarters] some time around dawn.”

Fearful of the potential threat to domestic security, Nilam remained inside the operation room and returned to the room despite being sent out six or seven times by Tholhath.

Nilam stayed close to President Nasheed, who was asking the operation commanders to clear the Republic Square of mutinying police. Nilam warned of dangerous consequences if the situation dragged on and worsened. He later learned that the military ranks were not functioning and some soldiers wanted to join the mutiny.

Nilam thought that a violent confrontation between police and the military might have been the desired outcome of the then-opposition. After the break of dawn, President Nasheed went out and addressed the mutinying police but they remained defiant.

More police officers kept joining the protest at Republic Square as false rumours began to circulate. About 45 soldiers from Kalhuthukkala Koshi came to the Republic Square. Nilam learned later that military police opened the gates to let the soldiers out.

Military officers also joined the police officers and opposition activists in taking over state broadcaster MNBC.

The president, defence minister and chief of defence forces were issuing orders because “the [military] lines weren’t working.”

“I was really saddened. This was not something I ever saw inside the military. There has been insubordination. There are former officers here [among MPs on the committee]. There is insubordination. But things have never happened like this in such an operation.”

Nilam saw a president in a “very helpless state”, which was “a sad moment.”

“We are entrusted with the duty and responsibility of protecting the country’s independence and sovereignty. It is truly disturbing to see something like that from [the military].”

The situation inside the barracks was chaotic. Soldiers were filming on their phones or cameras although it was strictly prohibited.

Nilam also learned that the military did not have “any control of [presidential residence] Muleeage after 7:00am or 7:30am in the morning.”

Police and ex-servicemen entered Muleeage after 7:15am on February 7. Nilam heard later that some officers of the Special Protection Group (SPG) guarding the President and Vice-President had joined the mutiny.

He also learned later that First Lady Madam Laila Ali was taken out of the presidential residence in a car whose number plates had been changed to avoid detection.

Nilam was surprised and saddened when the CoNI report did not include any recommendations for the MNDF. He believed it was important to thoroughly investigate the role of the military in the events of the day.

“That is because if something like this happens and it is not investigated, the consequences will be very dangerous. We are in that state now.”

Following the change of government, Defence Minister Nazim asked Nilam if he believed the transfer of power amounted to a coup or a revolution.

Nilam replied, “Looking at it academically, this has all the characteristics of a coup. Some signs are what would happen before while other signs are what occurs during the event. Then we have what happens afterward. I have even looked into this and studied this along principles that academicians would consider. So I told [Nazim] that this has all the characteristics. He didn’t say anything else.”

Under Maldivian law, a “coup d’etat” could not be carried out without the military’s involvement as the offence is specified and prohibited in the Defence Forces Act of 2008.

Inside the military headquarters, Nilam overheard President Nasheed refuse assistance from two foreign nations before he decided to resign.

“[The President] said this is an internal matter. He answered both calls in much the same way.”

Considering the chaotic situation at the Republic Square, there was possibility of bloodshed “if it dragged on” and the president’s life was in danger.

Nilam was present when current Defence Minister Nazim relayed the ultimatum to Tholhath for the president’s “unconditional” resignation.

Nilam saw military officers bang the president’s car with their boots while he was escorted to the President’s Office from the military headquarters. He also noted that current Chief of Defence Forces General Ahmed Shiyam took over as acting chief before President Nasheed officially resigned.

“There are a lot of questions here. I believe that this should be investigated thoroughly and looked into. These are very serious matters.”

Likes(0)Dislikes(0)

Brigadier General Nilam suspended following testimony to Government Oversight Committee

Former head of military intelligence, Brigadier General Ahmed Nilam, has been relieved of his duties at the Maldives National Defence Force (MNDF), by Defence Minister Colonel (Retired) Mohamed Nazim.

According to a statement by the Defence Ministry yesterday, General Nilam was suspended because a case involving the former head of military intelligence was under investigation.

The statement did not provide further details or specify the nature of the investigation and alleged offence.

The move follows the Brigadier General’s testimony (Dhivehi) to parliament’s Government Oversight Committee on January 9, which was made public on Wednesday after MPs on the committee voted to publicise minutes of the closed session.

During the past two weeks, the oversight committee has summoned high-ranking officers of the security services for its review of the Commission of National Inquiry’s (CNI’s) report into the transfer of presidential power on February 7, 2012.

In his testimony to the committee, Brigadier General Nilam said he was asked by Defence Minister Nazim if he believed that the transfer of power amounted to a coup or a revolution.

Nilam said he replied that, “looking at it academically, this has all the characteristics of a coup.”

“I have even looked into this and studied this along principles that academicians would consider. So I told [Nazim] that this has all the characteristics. He didn’t say anything else,” Nilam said.

Asked by pro-government Progressive Party of Maldives (PPM) MP Ahmed Nihan if he believed there was a coup d’etat, Nilam said based on his experience in military intelligence, “this has roots that go much deeper.”

Brigadier General Nilam was seen in leaked video from inside the MNDF headquarters showing a frenzied former President Nasheed ordering officers to go out and confront the mutinying police on the morning of February 7.

Responding to questions by committee members, Nilam explained that the president, defence minister and chief of defence forces were issuing orders because “the [military] lines weren’t working.”

“I was really saddened. This was not something I ever saw inside the military. There has been insubordination. There are former officers here [among MPs on the committee]. There is insubordination. But things have never happened like this in such an operation,” Nilam said at the committee.

Nilam added that he saw a president in a “very helpless” state, which was “a sad moment.”

“We are entrusted with the duty and responsibility of protecting the country’s independence and sovereignty. It is truly disturbing to see something like from [the military],” he said.

The brigadier general said he was present when current Defence Minister Nazim relayed the message for the president’s “unconditional” resignation.

He also noted that military officers banged the president’s car with their boots while he was taken to the President’s Office from the military headquarters and that current Chief of Defence Forces General Ahmed Shiyam took over as acting chief before President Nasheed officially resigned.

“There are lot of questions here. I believe that this should be investigated thoroughly and looked into. These are very serious matters,” he said.

Under Maldivian law, Brigadier General Nilam continued, a “coup d’etat” could not be carried out without the military’s involvement as the offence is specified and prohibited in the Defence Forces Act of 2008.

Asked by the committee’s chair, MP Ali Waheed, if there was a threat to the life of President Nasheed had he not resigned, Nilam said weapons were stored because there was fear of live armour being used and that the mutinying police were armed with riot gear.

Nilam also revealed that the military did not have “any control of [presidential residence] Muleeage after 7:00am or 7:30am in the morning.”

Police and ex-servicemen entered Muleeage after 7:15am on February 7, 2012, he added.

First Lady Laila Ali and the president’s daughters were reportedly taken to a safe location in the morning.

Continuing his testimony, Brigadier General Nilam said he overheard President refuse assistance from two foreign nations before he decided to resign.

“[The President] said this is an internal matter. He answered both calls in much the same way,” he said.

Nilam added that there was possibility of bloodshed “if it dragged on” and that the president’s life was in danger.

Meanwhile, former Chief Superintendent of Police Mohamed Jinah was also relieved of his duties last week following his testimony to the oversight committee.

Likes(0)Dislikes(0)

“Legal order” last option to compel judges to attend committee: MDP

A “legal order” from parliament is the last available option to compel three judges of the Hulhumale’ Magistrate Court to attend parliament’s Government Oversight Committee, following their refusal to answer two previous summons, the Maldivian Democratic Party (MDP) said in a statement on Saturday.

The press release stated that “the excuses” offered by the three magistrates on administrative grounds – contending that as judges of the lower courts they doubted whether they could answer questions regarding the Commission of National Inquiry’s report and that they needed to await a decision by the Judicial Service Commission (JSC) – were “reasons that lacked any principle.”

“Therefore, the party notes that the measure left to be taken to bring the summoned judges to the Majlis committee is to issue a legal order to that effect,” the statement read.

Asked for clarification on the “legal order”, MDP Spokesperson MP Hamid Abdul Gafoor said that the statement did not refer to a court order contrary to the “assumption” by Sun Online and Haveeru.

“No mention was made of a court order in the news brief. Sun appear to have assumed so. The Majlis can bring out an ‘amuru‘ [order] according to house rules,” Hamid explained.

‘Hulhumale’ Magistrate Court’

The MDP also contests the legitimacy of the Hulhumale’ Magistrate Court, which was created by the JSC before the enactment of the Judicature Act in October 2010.

A constitutional case concerning the magistrate court is currently pending at the Supreme Court.

Writing in his personal blog on October 9, Independent MP for Kulhudhufushi South, Mohamed ‘Kutti’ Nasheed, explained that a magistrate court could not be established at Hulhumale’ as the Judicature Act states that magistrate courts should be set up in inhabited islands aside from Male’ without a division of the trial courts (Criminal Court, Civil Court, Family Court and Juvenile Court).

According to appendix two of the constitution, Hulhumale’ is a district or ward of Male’ and not a separate inhabited island. The former magistrate court at Hulhumale’ should therefore have been dissolved when the Judicature Act was ratified, Nasheed argued.

The three magistrates of the contested Hulhumale’ Magistrate Court are Shujau Usman, Abdul Nasir Abdul Raheem and Hussain Mazeed.

“Summon any person”

The MDP statement meanwhile observed that article 99(a) of the constitution states that the People’s Majlis or any of its committee has the power to “summon any person to appear before it to give evidence under oath, or to produce documents. Any person who is questioned by the People’s Majlis as provided for  in this article shall answer to the best of his knowledge and ability.”

However, following the first attempt to summon the magistrates, the JSC and the Supreme Court made public statements insisting that the JSC was the only authority empowered by the constitution to hold judges accountable.

A statement by the JSC on October 9 citing the constitution, the Judicature Act and the Judicial Service Commission Act contended that no other state institution could interfere with the work of judges or make any attempt to hold judges accountable.

Under article 159(b) of the constitution, the JSC is empowered with the power and responsibility “to investigate complaints about the judiciary, and to take disciplinary action against them, including recommendations for dismissal.”

Parties in the ruling coalition have meanwhile condemned the decision to summon the magistrates as an attempt to influence the trial of former President Mohamed Nasheed at the Hulhumale’ Magistrate Court on charges of illegally detaining Criminal Court Chief Judge Abdulla Mohamed.

The formerly ruling MDP has a voting majority on the Government Oversight Committee.

While Speaker Abdulla Shahid sent the summons issued by the committee on October 9, local media reported that parliament’s Counsel General Fathmath Filza had advised that summoning judges was not within the mandate of the committee.

Meanwhile, following the judges’ snub of the second summons, MDP MP Ali Waheed told reporters outside parliament on Wednesday that the actions of the magistrates and the JSC as well as the Supreme Court’s encouragement of their behaviour was a “cat and mouse game” played by the judiciary.

“What we are witnessing is a ‘cat and mouse’ or a ‘hide and seek’ game being played between parliament and judiciary. If that is the case, we are going to play the cat and mouse chase, because we are not going to step back from our responsibilities,” he said.

Likes(0)Dislikes(0)

State institutions blame Finance Ministry for unpaid electricity bills

Senior officials of state institutions summoned to parliament’s Government Oversight Committee on Tuesday night blamed the Finance Ministry for unpaid electricity bills to the State Electricity Company (STELCO).

STELCO Chief Technical Officer Dr Mohamed Zaid told the committee that local councils informed STELCO that funds allocated in their annual budgets were only enough to pay electricity bills for two or three months.

Zaid said discussions with the government have been ongoing since STELCO’s board made a decision to disconnect electricity from state institutions with large overdue bills.

The company was owed MVR 174 million (US$11.3 million) from various state institutions, he said.

While 78 percent of STELCO’s expenditure was on diesel, Dr Zaid revealed that the company owed MVR 132 million (US$8.6 million) for oil purchased on credit, including MVR 34 million (US$2.2 million) for oil bills currently overdue.

Among the institutions with the largest outstanding bills, the Male’ Health Corporation (MHC), which operates the Indira Gandhi Memorial Hospital (IGMH), owes STELCO MVR 31 million (US$2 million) for 20 months of unpaid bills while the Maldives Broadcasting Corporation (MBC) owes MVR 7.1 million (US$460,000) for the past five months.

Speaking at the committee, Male’ City Councillor Aimon Ismail said the Finance Ministry did not provide MVR 6.74 million (US$437,094) requested by the council for electricity costs in 2012. The Male’ City Council is responsible for paying electricity bills for mosques, public parks and street lights in the capital.

Meanwhile, newspaper Haveeru reported yesterday (Wednesday) that parliament’s Finance Committee decided to give the Finance Ministry a week to settle MBC’s outstanding bills in addition to asking the Auditor General’s Office to conduct a special performance audit of the state broadcaster.

Likes(0)Dislikes(0)